

133] From: Tokyo  
To: Washington  
15 November 1941  
(J19)  
Circular #2376

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

- (1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:  
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
- (2) Japan-U. S. S. E. relations:  
KITANOKAZI KUMOMI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
- (3) Japan-British relations:  
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

[Handwritten note:] J 19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.

J19-1, 6875 (Y) Navy Trans 11-28-41 S (TT) Intercepted Nov 19, 1941.

134] From: CINCPAC  
For Action: OPNAV  
Date: 25 NOVEMBER 1941  
Information: COMSINTKEN  
Decoded by: P R White

CINCPAC  
FOURTEEN

[Handwritten:] COPYK.

281426

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no kaze kumori XX England X Nishi no kaze hare X wagnote X British and consisten monitoring above broadcasts.

Secret

## EXHIBIT NO. 152

BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, HONOLULU, HAWAII

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON DAMAGE BY PROJECTILES IN THE CITY OF HONOLULU ON  
DECEMBER 7, 1941

Immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and after several water main breaks and interruptions of water service had been reported, the writer was delegated by Mr. Frederick Ohrt, Manager and Chief Engineer, Board of Water Supply, to visit the various points in the city where damage had been done and to take notes on the damage and get photographs where practical. This was desired in order that the water department, as a vital agency, would be better qualified in the event of renewed attacks to operate effectively in protecting water mains and other installations and repairing any that were damaged.

Accordingly, on December 8, and several days following, some forty to fifty places were visited and available information collected. The chief points are listed below:

A Partial List of Points in Honolulu Reported as Struck by Projectiles on December 7, 1941.

(Not all these points were visited; some are probably duplicates due to confusion in reporting.)

Washington Place	2113 Bingham Street
South and Queen Streets	Iolani School & Judd Street
2840 Kalihi Street	Henry Street, upper end
2683 Pacific Heights Road	1838 Puowaina Street
625 Ala Moana	56 Wyllie Street
758 Kaaloa Street	Lewers and Kuhio Streets
1807 Liliha Street	Kamehameha Heights
2653 Rooke Street	44 Dowsett Avenue
Alewa Heights	May Damon residence, Moanalua
Fort and School Streets	2522 Kalibi Road
Kuhio and Kalakau Streets	Moanalua Garden
610 E Street, Damon Tract	Police Shooting Range, water front
North School Street	2640 Kamanaiiki Road
2160 Numana Road	Waipa Lane
Iolani Palace	1443 Nuuanu Avenue
Judd and Liliha Streets	956 Spencer Street
Nisei Club, 44 South School	1630 Leilehua Street
Lewers and Cooke Company	Robello Lane
Hauoli and McCully Streets	Hawaiian Gas Products, Kuwili St.
Kalihi Pump Station	467 Judd Street
Fort Armstrong	Judd and Iholena Streets
Nuuanu and Kukui Streets	Dowsett Ave. and Alika Drive
734 McCully	Kamamalu Park
3122 Duval Street	Kukui Street

Principal sources of information were the daily papers, the Territorial and City-County offices of Public Works the City-County Road and Garbage Departments, the Board of Water Supply Maintenance and other divisions, the Honolulu Police Department daily log, and finally persons at the various sites of damage. The writer is not an expert in the field of ballistics, or high explosive projectiles, and to avoid error has recorded only what was actually seen, as to damage and explosion effects, without attempting to say what sort of projectile was responsible.

Many observers have testified to the immediate commencement of fire after the striking of projectiles at Lunaliilo School and at McCully and King Streets, suggesting that these projectiles may have been of the incendiary type. At many other points the projectiles landed either inside or near houses and then exploded to produce two marked effects, (1) blast damage, and (2) splinter damage. The combination of these two was sufficient to totally wreck a small two- or three-room house when landing in it, or one side and a room or two of a larger house. In such case the damage as the far side of the house or two or three partitions away was not great.

The blast damage was very severe on an adjacent wall, floor, or windows, or on furniture in the room struck, blowing them out, and generally wrecking furniture. In some cases wood splinters or fragments of bric-a-brac were driven through plaster board in the manner of tornado damage. However, it was noticeable that blast damage fell off very rapidly and unbroken windows would be found in the second or third wall removed from the focus of explosion.

Splinter damage was similar in its falling off characteristics. Prentiss says splinter velocities may be 5,000 to 7,000 ft./sec., or 3 to 4 times that of a rifle bullet, but that because of small size and irregular shape, the velocity falls off very rapidly. Observations in Honolulu confirm this strongly. Splinters often went through wooden partitions or the first web of concrete hollow tile but commonly did not go through a second 1" board, and in no case seen by the writer did they go through both sides of an 8' hollow tile wall. In the near vicinity of the focus there was much tearing and rending of wood due chiefly to blast, or to displacement of the structure. In cases where the projectile landed in the street a few feet from buildings, the outer walls were well spattered by splinters, many of which did not pass through even the wooden wall.

A few passed through one or two wooden walls, or broke off corners of wood or masonry. Many windows were broken. It is the the writer's impression that except for large glass windows, by far the most damage was blast damage. (This applies to the particular projectiles involved chiefly on December 7, 1941, but is no prediction.)

Some projectiles landing in gardens and out of doors apparently did not explode at all, but merely made a one- or two-foot hole in wet ground and passed several feet downward. General advice to persons in air raids is well borne out by observations. At any point seen by the writer, a person lying in a two-foot trench or behind a two-foot embankment 20 feet away would have been safe. Of course some persons not over 20 feet away were unharmed without protection but that was good luck. Injury and death were due to being tossed about by blast effect, to being struck by objects actuated by blast, and to splinters or fragments of pavement or pavement thrown by explosion.

Damage in one store was exceedingly slight by direct hit, blast or explosion, but came chiefly by water from the breaking of one sprinkler head. The corner of one small garage annex was struck by a projectile which knocked off one or two cubic feet of the concrete foundation and splintered the corner of the woodwork but did not explode and did no injury to two people eight or ten feet away. All the observations of the writer indicate that on hearing a raid alarm it is imperative to get under the best cover that is nearby, and that side cover is most important, and roof cover next. If roof cover is not available, an open trench or the corner of a walled garage even if open to one side offer a large proportional safety.

Prepared by:

/s/ Chester K. Wentworth,  
CHESTER K. WENTWORTH,  
*Principal Geologist.*

Approved by:

/s/ Frederick Ohrt,  
FREDERICK OHRT,  
*Manager and Chief Engineer,*

December 23, 1941

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 152 is a map of the City of Honolulu, reflecting points struck by projectiles, December 7, 1941, and is reproduced as Item No. 37 In Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

## EXHIBIT NO. 153

### STATEMENT TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A REVIEW OF CIVILIAN AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII FROM TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Introduced by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, Territory of Hawaii

[1] To the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor attack

#### I. Purpose of this statement

It is the understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your Honorable Congressional Committee has as its objective an exhaustive investigation intended to present to the public a full report on all activities leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and that in carrying out this investigation all persons have been invited to present to the Committee any material, documents or other relevant information pertaining thereto.

It is the further understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your Committee, in addition to its primary objective of bringing before the public any relevant information having any bearing of significance relative to a final determination of responsibility for that disaster, is also interested in correcting any deficiencies, omissions, misapprehensions or incorrect conclusions or